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MISSION (IM)POSSIBILITY: DETERMINING WHEN
MANDAMUS IS AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY TO ADDRESS
AGENCY DELAY OR INACTION
Faith Proper*
Abstract
Judicial review of administrative agency delay or inaction presents
delicate questions about, and potent opportunities to define, the balance
of power within the American system of governance. Recently, a
significant backlog of Medicare appeals for healthcare providers has
spawned litigation, with providers asking the courts to address agency
delay by compelling action through a writ of mandamus. Though relying
on substantively similar factual bases, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit reached divergent mandamus analyses. Despite differing
outcomes, both analyses suffer from the same fundamental flaws: the
courts not only fail to identify the cause of the problem, but also fail to
design a remedy that addresses that cause. This Note argues that courts
should make an explicit factual finding of possibility before issuing a writ
of mandamus against an administrative agency due to inaction or delay.
Adding this element in the initial mandamus inquiry will help courts
avoid dictating policy priorities, avoid infringing on the legislative
funding power, and accord proper respect to the underlying principles of
the separation of powers within the American system.
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“[T]he most serious mistakes are not being made as a result of wrong
answers. The truly dangerous thing is asking the wrong questions.” 1
INTRODUCTION
Judicial review of administrative agency inaction and delay presents
delicate questions about, and potent opportunities to define, the balance
within the American system.2 Constitutionally-founded checks and
balances are increasingly scarce in a progressively administrative state,3
and striking the right balance between efficiency and tyranny is no small
task.4 Administrative agencies play a vital yet not constitutionalized role
that treads a fine line between efficiency and overreach.5 The courts’ role
in monitoring or reforming agency action must walk—and often draw—
a line between process and policy, enforcing the former while leaving the
latter to the political branches.6
The tension between agency autonomy and judicial oversight has been
set in sharp relief through recent litigation about a backlog in Medicare
claims on appeal.7 In the face of agency inaction, healthcare providers
sought refuge in the courts to address the delays.8 Though relying on
1. PETER F. DRUCKER, MEN, IDEAS, AND POLITICS, at ix (2010).
2. See generally Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio, Agency Delays: How a Principal-Agent
Approach Can Inform Judicial and Executive Branch Review of Agency Foot-Dragging, 79 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1381 (2011) (discussing one possible way to frame the tensions inherent in an
administrative state).
3. See Evan J. Criddle, When Delegation Begets Domination: Due Process of
Administrative Lawmaking, 46 GA. L. REV. 117, 190 (2011) (discussing the impact of increased
administrative power on constitutional due process guarantees).
4. See generally D.A. Candeub, Tyranny and Administrative Law, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 49
(2017) (arguing that the administrative state relies on assumptions that inherently conflict with
the U.S. Constitution).
5. See generally Emily S. Bremer, The Unwritten Administrative Constitution, 66 FLA. L.
REV. 1215, 1215 (2014) (arguing that American administrative rules fulfill important functions,
including “determining institutional boundaries, establishing the government–citizen relationship,
and protecting fundamental values.”).
6. Criddle, supra note 3, at 135–37 (discussing the development of the nondelegation
doctrine).
7. See HHS Primer: The Medicare Appeals Process, HHS.GOV 3, https://www.hhs.gov/
sites/default/files/dab/medicare-appeals-backlog.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9AA-6ZMS] (describing
the backlog).
8. See generally, e.g., Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Price, 867 F.3d 160 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (seeking
mandamus to compel the Secretary of Health and Human Services to process administrative
appeals of denials of Medicare patient reimbursement claims within the statutory timeline).
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substantively similar factual bases, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit reached opposing outcomes on whether mandamus was an
appropriate remedy.9 Cabining the question of which court arrived at the
“right” answer, this Note argues that both courts’ analyses suffer from the
same fundamental flaws: the courts not only fail to identify the
underlying cause of the problem, but also fail to design a remedy that
addresses that cause.10 Understanding the cause of a problem is an
essential step in determining an appropriate solution. Because an
agency’s power to fix a problem is limited by the role the agency plays
in creating the problem, determining the root cause would allow the court
to determine whether a writ of mandamus would be effective. This Note
argues that courts should include an explicit factual finding of possibility
before issuing a writ of mandamus simply ordering an agency to take
action.
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a brief description
of the statutorily established Medicare appeals process and paints a
picture of the backlog that led to litigation beginning in 2014. Part II
describes the diverging decisions between the Fourth and D.C. Circuits
in declining and granting mandamus, respectively. Part III argues that
neither court’s process was sufficient for fashioning an appropriate
remedy because both courts failed to define whether the problem was
caused by inadequate funding or inefficient management. If the backlog
was caused by inefficient management of agency resources, mandamus
is an appropriate remedy because this is a cause internal to the agency
and, thus, more within the agency’s control to fix. However, if the
backlog was caused by inadequate funding, mandamus is not an
appropriate remedy because the court cannot and should not order an
agency to do what an agency cannot possibly do without legislative
intervention. Part III also suggests a solution: courts should incorporate
an explicit factual finding of possibility before issuing a writ of
mandamus against an administrative agency to ensure that the writ does
not infringe on the legislative purview by dictating funding priorities to
Congress. This Note concludes with a broader discussion of the
implications of mandamus for separation of powers in an administrative
state.

9. See infra Sections II.B, II.C (describing the different analyses and outcomes).
10. See infra Sections III.B, III.C.
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I. THE MEDICARE APPEALS PROCESS AND BACKLOG
Medicare is the United States’ federally funded health insurance
program for individuals over the age of sixty-five or with certain medical
disabilities.11 As a single-payer program, Medicare unifies healthcare
services for its beneficiaries by providing payment directly to healthcare
providers.12 Medicare accounts for 14% of the entire federal budget and
cost $582 billion in the 2018 fiscal year.13 Financing approximately 20%
of all healthcare spending in the United States,14 Medicare plays a vital
role in supporting the sustainability of the entire American healthcare
system.15 Considering that 44 million people (about 15% of the U.S.
population) are covered by Medicare, the stakes are high. 16 So, by
statute,17 Congress has established a comprehensive process for both
individuals and providers to appeal Medicare coverage and
reimbursement determinations.18 Beginning in 2013, the number of
appeals surged,19 causing a significant backlog of pending appeals that
the Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals (OMHA) was unable to
adjudicate within the statutory deadlines.20 This Part explains the
Medicare appeals process, timelines, and alleged causes of the backlog.
A. The Medicare Appeals Process
After treating patients covered by Medicare, healthcare providers
submit a claim for reimbursement that is reviewed by a Medicare
Administrative Contractor (MAC).21 The MAC makes an initial
determination on payment within 45 days of receiving the claim.22 If the
11. Medicare Program - General Information, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-General-Information/MedicareGenInfo/index.html
[https://perma.cc/FXQ5-C5J3] (last modified Nov. 13, 2019, 10:51 PM).
12. Id.
13. Budget Basics: Medicare, PETER G. PETERSON FOUND. (Apr. 30, 2019),
https://www.pgpf.org/budget-basics/budget-explainer-medicare [https://perma.cc/HH6A-9RTY].
14. Id.
15. See Bob Rosenblatt, Why Medicare Matters to All Americans, AARP (Feb. 7, 2017),
https://www.aarp.org/politics-society/advocacy/info-2017/why-medicare-matters-to-all-americans.html
[https://perma.cc/657X-7AKZ].
16. BEN UMANS & K. LYNN NONNEMAKER, AARP PUB. POLICY INST., THE MEDICARE
BENEFICIARY POPULATION 1 (2009), https://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/health/fs149_medicare.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MR43-JH67].
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff (2012) (outlining the appeals process).
18. See HHS Primer: The Medicare Appeals Process, supra note 7, at 1–2.
19. Id. at 3 (showing an increase from approximately 100,000 claims in 2012 to over
400,000 claims in 2013).
20. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 47 (D.D.C. 2014), rev’d, 812 F.3d 183
(D.C. Cir. 2016).
21. Id. at 46; see 42 U.S.C. § 1395kk-1(a)(1)–(4).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(a)(2)(A).
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claim is denied and the healthcare provider wants to appeal that
determination, Congress has established a four-step appellate process,
which includes the possibility of escalation for judicial review on the
merits.23 First, within 120 days, the healthcare provider may request a
redetermination by the MAC; once requested, the MAC must reconsider
the decision within 60 days.24 If unsatisfied, the healthcare provider may
appeal next to a Qualified Independent Contractor (QIC).25 The QIC has
up to 60 days to consider the appeal and return a decision. 26 Both the
MACs and QICs operate under the umbrella of Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services (CMS).27 If the healthcare provider wants to appeal
the QIC’s determination, the healthcare provider can file a request for a
hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ) in OMHA.28 OMHA is
independent of CMS;29 thus, arguably, this third stage is the first
opportunity for all parties to present their cases in a neutral forum.30 ALJs
have 90 days from the time the healthcare provider requests a hearing to
issue a decision.31 After the ALJ has issued a decision, healthcare
providers have one final administrative stop before escalation to the
federal district court: an appeal to a division of the Departmental Appeals
Board (DAB), which conducts a de novo review.32 The DAB has 90 days
to issue a decision and rarely holds a hearing unless presented with a
particularly unique or challenging point of fact or law.33 The DAB makes
a determination on behalf of the Secretary of Health and Human Services

23. Id. § 1395ff(b)(1)(A); HHS Primer: The Medicare Appeals Process, supra note 7, at 1.
See generally, e.g., Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Price, No. 5:15-CV-319-D, 2017 WL
1048102 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 1, 2017) (adjudicating a Medicare claim for reimbursement for
approximately $66,000 on the merits), adopted by 2017 WL 1049476 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 17, 2017).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(a)(3)(C); HHS Primer: The Medicare Appeals Process, supra note
7, at 1.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(c)(3)(B)(i); HHS Primer: The Medicare Appeals Process, supra
note 7, at 1.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(c)(3)(C)(i); HHS Primer: The Medicare Appeals Process, supra
note 7, at 2.
27. See HHS Primer: The Medicare Appeals Process, supra note 7, at 2.
28. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(d)(1)(A).
29. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 46 (D.D.C. 2014), rev’d, 812 F.3d 183
(D.C. Cir. 2016); HHS Primer: The Medicare Appeals Process, supra note 7, at 2.
30. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 46.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(d)(1)(A); Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 46.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(d)(2). The specific division of the DAB that reviews Medicare
claims is called the Medicare Appeals Council, and this body is referred to as the “MAC” in
relevant regulations. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 46. To avoid confusion, the courts (and
this Note) adopt the conventions of the parties and refer to the body overseeing this fourth and
final administrative step as “DAB.” See id.
33. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 186.
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(Secretary).34 This determination may be appealed to a federal district
court to evaluate the merits of reimbursement for the underlying claim.35
If this stage is reached, the district court judge evaluates whether the
patient’s treatment for her medical conditions fall within the Medicare
guidelines.36
Central to the question of mandamus, the Medicare Act provides
healthcare providers with the opportunity to “escalate” a claim if forced
to wait longer than the prescribed statutory period.37 Thus, a healthcare
provider who waits longer than 60 days for a decision from a QIC may
escalate the appeal to the ALJ;38 a healthcare provider who waits longer
than 90 days for an ALJ decision may escalate the appeal to the DAB;39
and a healthcare provider who waits longer than 90 days for a DAB
decision may escalate the appeal to a federal district court by filing a civil
action.40 The federal district court may then review the case on the merits,
but the standard of review is more deferential to the decision of the last
deliberative administrative body than the ALJ’s essentially de novo
review.41
B. The Medicare Appeals Backlog
Beginning in 2012, an increased volume of claims overwhelmed this
appellate process.42 Between 2010 and 2015, OMHA experienced a
442% increase in the number of appeals received annually.43 During this
timeframe, however, OMHA’s funding remained stagnant.44 By the end
of 2015, over 800,000 appeals were pending adjudication.45 The causes
of this increase are debated. The Secretary points primarily to external
factors, including a surge in the number of Medicare enrollees as “baby

34. See Departmental Appeals Board (DAB), HHS.GOV, https://www.hhs.gov/about/
agencies/dab/index.html [https://perma.cc/N68P-CZ7P].
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b)(2)(C)(i); Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 186.
36. See, e.g., Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Price, No. 5:15-CV-319-D, 2017 WL
1048102, at *18 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 1, 2017) (discussing the underlying claim of medical necessity
in great detail, holding that a Medicare reimbursement claim was improperly denied, and
reversing in favor of the healthcare provider), adopted by 2017 WL 1049476 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 17,
2017).
37. See id. at *2.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(c)(3)(C)(ii).
39. Id. § 1395ff(d)(3)(A).
40. Id. § 1395ff(d)(3)(B).
41. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 191 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
42. HHS Primer: The Medicare Appeals Process, supra note 7, at 3.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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boomers” become eligible,46 additional appeals resulting from a new
Recovery Audit Program (instituted in 2010 in response to a
Congressional mandate to increase accountability and accuracy in
Medicare reimbursements), and additional Medicaid State Agency
appeals of Medicare and Medicaid coverage denials.47 In contrast,
healthcare providers pointed to factors internal to the agency that were
contributing to the backlog, including the Secretary’s refusal to settle
pending claims en masse48 and an overzealous Recovery Audit Program49
that reclaims improperly reimbursed Medicare claims due to “perverse
[financial] incentives.”50 Whatever the cause, according to the
Secretary’s own estimates, it would take over ten years to address a
backlog of this size (assuming no additional appeals are filed). 51 With
millions of dollars at stake, some healthcare providers opted to carve their
own pathway towards reimbursement through the courts.
II. DIVERGING MANDAMUS DECISIONS
Facing large deductions from anticipated operating budgets, some
healthcare providers pursued a new path forward: petitioning the courts
to issue a writ of mandamus to force administrative action.52 This writ, if
granted, would order the Secretary to hear the healthcare providers’
pending appeals within the statutory period of ninety days and require the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to comply with
the statutory timelines for appeals from all healthcare providers.53 This
46. See American Generation Fast Facts, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2013/11/06/us/
baby-boomer-generation-fast-facts/index.html [https://perma.cc/5XBD-FSAJ] (last updated Aug.
17, 2019, 9:36 AM) (stating that the baby boom began between 1943 and 1946 and led to a peak
population of 78.8 million baby boomers).
47. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Burwell, 816 F.3d 48, 51 (4th Cir. 2016); see HHS
Primer: The Medicare Appeals Process, supra note 7, at 3.
48. Cf. Matt Phifer, Let’s Make a Deal: Medicare Expands Settlement Process,
BLOOMBERG L. (May 24, 2018, 3:57 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/health-law-andbusiness/lets-make-a-deal-medicare-expands-settlement-process [https://perma.cc/XYS3-N9MD].
49. See generally Program History and Authorities, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Monitoring-Programs/
recovery-audit-program-parts-c-and-d/Program-History-and-Authorities.html [https://perma.cc/
8LY6-GKTQ] (last updated Nov. 15, 2019, 5:39 PM) (explaining the history of creating and
expanding the Recovery Audit Program).
50. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 816 F.3d at 51 (stating that the independent contractors
hired to run the Recovery Audit Program are inappropriately paid on a contingency basis
calculated based on how much money is reclaimed from reimbursements already given to
healthcare providers).
51. Id. at 50–51.
52. Complaint at 21–22, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 209 F. Supp. 3d 221 (D.D.C. 2016)
(No. 1:14-cv-851).
53. Id.
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Part describes the elements of mandamus, outlines the two cases at the
center of the circuit split, and describes each court’s analysis leading up
to either granting or denying mandamus.
A. Elements of Mandamus
District courts have original jurisdiction in a federal mandamus action
and may compel a federal officer or agency to perform a duty owed to the
plaintiff.54 Injunctive relief is not a right55 but rather a tool left to the
court’s discretion that should be exercised for the public good within the
bounds of the law.56 The three elements to establish a right to mandamus
are well-known and uncontroversial. Mandamus will be issued when: (1)
the plaintiff has a clear and demonstrable right to relief; (2) there is a clear
duty imposed on the defendant to do the act in question; and (3) no other
adequate remedy is available.57 With this foundation in the elements of
mandamus, the following subsections describe the two cases: one
granting mandamus and one denying mandamus.
B. American Hospital Association v. Burwell
American Hospital Association v. Burwell58 is the first major case
filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia asking for a
writ of mandamus rather than judicial review on the merits of the claim.
The healthcare-provider plaintiffs asserted that escalation was not an
adequate alternative remedy because it would force them to relinquish the
right to establish an administrative record during the ALJ hearing.59
Without the administrative record from the ALJ hearing, the DAB would
likely base its review solely on the MAC record.60 Sympathetic to the
healthcare providers’ argument, the D.C. District Court issued

54. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (2012).
55. See 33 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 8385 (2d ed.), Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2019).
56. Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333 U.S. 426, 431 (1948) (“[D]eclaratory judgment, like other
forms of equitable relief, should be granted only as a matter of judicial discretion, exercised in the
public interest.”).
57. See United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 534 (D.C. Cir. 2011); United States ex rel.
Rahman v. Oncology Assocs., P.C., 198 F.3d 502, 511 (4th Cir. 1999); Ethel R. Alston,
Annotation, Mandamus, Under 28 U.S.C.A. §1361, to Compel Prompt Hearing in Appeal from
Denial of Social Security Disability Benefits, 47 A.L.R. Fed. 929 (2011).
58. 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 55 (D.D.C. 2014), rev’d, 812 F.3d 183 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
59. Id. at 48.
60. Id. (“[A]lthough the DAB may conduct additional proceedings, it is not required to do
so. . . . As a consequence, hospitals find that they are most likely to succeed on their appeals at
the ALJ level.”).
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mandamus.61 The mandamus order discussed the form of relief the court
would provide and, due to lack of a suggested plan from the Secretary,
relied heavily on the plaintiffs’ suggested remedies.62 The order targeted
the backlog existing in the third stage of the Medicare appeals process—
the ALJ hearings—and set percentage reduction goals for the Secretary
to meet over the next four years.63 The order also provided that any
healthcare providers with claims still pending on January 1, 2021, that
have been pending for longer than one year may petition a federal court
for a declaratory judgment in their favor for payment on the claim.64
After the D.C. District Court denied the Secretary’s motion for
reconsideration,65 the Secretary appealed to the D.C. Circuit.66 The
Secretary argued that it would be impossible to meet the timeline set by
the D.C. District Court given current funding and congressional
constraints.67 The D.C. Circuit agreed with the Secretary (to an extent),
vacated the mandamus order, and remanded to the D.C. District Court for
an explicit finding of possibility.68 Regardless of the vacated mandamus
order, however, the Secretary and Congress had already begun to take
financial steps to comply with the D.C. District Court’s timeline.69 Part
III will take up the trajectory of this case again.
C. Cumberland County Hospital System, Inc. v. Burwell70
Meanwhile, in North Carolina, Cumberland County Hospital System
had a similar idea but received a less welcome outcome. 71 Like the
American Hospital Association, Cumberland County Hospital System
brought an action requesting that the court force the Secretary to meet the
statutory deadlines for administrative review of denied claims for

61. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 14-cv-851 (JEB), 2016 WL 7076983, at *1 (D.D.C.
Dec. 5, 2016), vacated, 867 F.3d 160 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
62. See id. at *2–3.
63. Id. at *3 (ordering the Secretary to reduce the backlog by 30% by the end of 2017, 60%
by the end of 2018, 90% by the end of 2019, and eliminate the backlog by the end of 2020).
64. Id.
65. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 14-cv-851 (JEB), 2017 WL 6209175, at *1 (D.D.C.
Jan. 4, 2017), vacated, 867 F.3d 160 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
66. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 867 F.3d at 165.
67. Id. (arguing that meeting the timeline would (1) require illegally eliminating the RAC
program, (2) require violating the Medicare Act by resolving claims en masse and not based on
merit, and (3) exacerbate the backlog by giving healthcare providers a perverse incentive to file
unmeritorious claims with the hope and knowledge of the pending deadline).
68. See id. at 161 (stating that “[o]ught implies can” when issuing a writ of mandamus).
69. See infra notes 105–112 and accompanying text.
70. 816 F.3d 48 (4th Cir. 2016).
71. See id. at 57.
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Medicare reimbursement.72 While advancing similar arguments as the
American Hospital Association, Cumberland County Hospital System
further argued that the third stage of administrative review, before an ALJ
in OMHA, presents the first opportunity for hospitals to obtain a hearing
and review by an independent adjudicator with no financial stake in the
outcome.73 While evaluating the appropriateness of the mandamus
remedy, the district court focused on whether the statute provided a
“[c]lear right to relief and clear duty to act.”74 The district court found
that the statute did not impose a clear duty on the Secretary to act within
the timeline;75 rather, the court found that the escalation procedures
spelled out within the same statute76 indicate that Congress anticipated
delays in the Medicare appeals adjudication process and prescribed the
appropriate remedy.77 Given the full context of the statute, the court
found that Congress did not intend to confer an imperative duty on the
Secretary78 but rather to set forth the recommended process to be
followed in adjudicating Medicare appeals.79
Beyond this, the court further stated that equitable considerations
weighed against granting mandamus in this situation.80 The court
emphasized that mandamus is a drastic remedy that is appropriate only in
tightly cabined circumstances.81 Citing the district court opinion in
American Hospital Association v. Burwell,82 this court stated that the state
of affairs at OMHA was beyond the ability of the court to solve83:
Congress funds OMHA, Congress created the RAC
program, and Congress is aware of the inundation of appeals
. . . . So what might the Court do? It makes little sense to
force the Secretary to ask Congress for funding to solve a
problem of which Congress is well aware. At best, [issuing
mandamus] would be an empty gesture, at worst judicial
overstepping.84
72. See Complaint, at 1, Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Burwell, (E.D.N.C. Mar. 18,
2015), aff’d, 816 F.3d 48 (4th Cir. 2016).
73. See id. at 3.
74. See Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Burwell, No. 5:14–CV–508–BR, 2015 WL
1249959, at *5 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 18, 2015).
75. Id. at *6.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff (2012).
77. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 2015 WL 1249959, at *6.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at *7.
81. Id. at *5.
82. 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 55 (D.D.C. 2014), rev’d, 812 F.3d 183 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
83. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 2015 WL 1249959, at *8.
84. Id. at *7 (quoting Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 55).
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The court discussed the difficult and precarious financial situation of
OMHA and found that the Secretary had limited flexibility to address the
problem.85 Without making a factual finding as to the cause of the
problem, the court held that the problem was best left for the political
branches to address.86 Implying that the court believed the issue to be
inadequate resources, the court stated that intervening would not solve
the problem but would simply disrupt the Secretary’s ability to allocate
limited resources amongst competing priorities.87 So, while sympathetic
to the difficult position the delays placed the Cumberland County
Hospital System in, the court declined to intervene.88 On appeal, the
Fourth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision denying mandamus.89
The court agreed with the district court’s equitable concerns, indicating
that this problem was best left for the political branches.90
D. Diverging Analyses
There are two main differences between the D.C. Circuit and Fourth
Circuit approaches. First, the D.C. Circuit put more emphasis on the
mandatory nature of the administrator’s duty to hear Medicare appeals
cases within 90 days at the ALJ stage. Second, the Fourth Circuit found
the statutory escalation procedures adequate, while the D.C. Circuit did
not. In these cases, the courts’ analyses first diverge in their
interpretations of the word “shall.” Differing interpretations of the word
“shall” led to different outcomes. The D.C. Circuit emphasized the
mandatory nature of this word as yielding both a right and a duty,91 while
the Fourth Circuit found the language directive rather than obligatory—
given the analysis of the entire statutory scheme as a whole—and found
neither a right nor a duty imposed on the Secretary.92
The other substantive point of disagreement is the courts’ analyses of
whether the statutorily provided escalation procedure yields an
“adequate” alternative remedy. Surprisingly, neither court defined the
term “adequate” or explained its rationale behind its decision on this
factor.93 The Fourth Circuit stood behind the sufficiency of the process
established by the Medicare Act.94 The court rejected the plaintiff’s
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at *8.
Id. at *9.
Id.
Id. at *10.
Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Burwell, 816 F.3d 48, 57 (4th Cir. 2016).
Id.
Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 192 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 816 F.3d at 56.
See id. at 52; Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 191.
Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 816 F.3d at 56.
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argument that the third stage—review by an ALJ—provides significant
procedural rights unavailable at other points in the process.95 Indeed, the
Fourth Circuit pointed out that there is no guaranteed right to introduce
new evidence during the ALJ stage even when that stage is reached.96 On
the other hand, the D.C. Circuit emphasized that the escalation process
available by statute is insufficient given the unlikelihood of receiving a
timely hearing by moving past the ALJ to the DAB.97 The court stated
that “[m]erely providing a consequence for noncompliance does not
necessarily undermine the force of [the] command.”98
The problem inherent in these conflicting analyses is that both are
justifiable given the content of the statute and prevailing norms of
statutory construction.99 In the face of two justifiable explanations, the
Fourth Circuit exercised deference to the legislative process,100 while the
D.C. Circuit decided that judicial action was justified to enforce what it
perceived as already declared mandatory deadlines.101 While an entire
paper could be dedicated to a discussion of which court got it “right,”102
subsequent events moot this discussion: Congress decided to act.103 In
light of this development, this Note discusses the implications of the D.C.
Circuit’s decision to issue mandamus and questions whether clearing the
backlog was achieved in a constitutionally justifiable manner.
III. THE ENDS AND THE MEANS
Although Congress has acted to moot this controversy by increasing
the agency’s funding, the larger question regarding the propriety of using
mandamus relief to redress the quagmire remains. Because neither court
identified the cause of the problem before determining the appropriate
solution, both circuits risk inefficiency and infringement by not
determining when mandamus would help to solve the problem. This Part
95. Id. at 55–56.
96. Id. at 56.
97. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 191.
98. Id. at 190.
99. For an interesting discussion of the modern rules of statutory interpretation, see
generally Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A Survey
of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298 (2018).
100. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 816 F.3d at 56.
101. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 190.
102. See, e.g., Stephen C. Robin, Recent Development, Healing Medicare: Enforcing
Administrative Law Deadlines in Medicare Appeals, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1293, 1310–12 (2017)
(discussing how courts should enforce agency deadlines when facing agency inaction and
concluding in favor of the D.C. Circuit’s approach).
103. Virgil Dickson, Medicare Appeals Backlog Plummets More than 30% Since 2017,
MOD. HEALTHCARE (Aug. 6. 2018, 1:00 AM), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/
20180806/NEWS/180809936 [https://perma.cc/E7C9-6FPE].
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identifies problems with both courts’ analyses and argues, as a threshold
matter, that courts should make an explicit finding that it is possible for
the agency to comply with the writ of mandamus before continuing any
mandamus analysis. This finding of fact that an agency is able to comply
with the order will enhance judicial efficiency and avoid infringing on
separation of powers principles.
A. An Unexpected Outcome
Temporarily leaving aside any concerns with the circuits’ analyses,
something unexpected happened: Congress acted.104 After the mandamus
relief was ordered in December of 2016, Congress appropriated
significant additional funding to OMHA.105 The increased funding
enabled the Secretary to hire additional ALJs and double OMHA’s
previous adjudication capacity.106 Because of this increased funding—
coupled with increased settlement initiatives—the Secretary now projects
that OMHA will eliminate the backlog by 2022.107 The American
Hospital Association objected to this timeline.108 It argued that this
timeline does not comply with the court’s order and is insufficient given
OMHA’s newfound resources.109 The D.C. District Court ordered
mandamus that aligns with the government’s own projections.110 The
order requires the government to reduce the backlog by 19% by the end
of fiscal year 2019, 49% by the end of fiscal year 2020, 75% by the end
of fiscal year 2021, and to eliminate the backlog by the end of fiscal year
2022.111
This series of events begs the question: does it matter if the court was
right to issue mandamus in the first place? Congress took action to resolve
an ongoing problem that had been neglected for years. While correlation
104. Jacqueline LaPointe, HHS to Clear Medicare Appeals Backlog by 2022, Court Docs
Show, REVCYCLEINTELLIGENCE (Aug. 22, 2018), https://revcycleintelligence.com/news/hhs-toclear-medicare-appeals-backlog-by-2022-court-docs-show [https://perma.cc/GJ3R-JGC6].
105. Defendant’s Status Report and Response to Plaintiffs’ Proposed Non-Deadline
Remedies at 1, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Azar, No. 14-cv-851 (JEB) (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2018) [hereinafter
Defendant’s Status Report]; HHS Fiscal Year 2018 Budget in Brief - OMHA, HHS,
https://www.hhs.gov/about/budget/fy2018/budget-in-brief/omha/index.html [https://perma.cc/3
EJT-PEBD] (last updated May 23, 2017); Matt Phifer, Hospitals, Government at Odds Over
Medicare Appeals Drawdown, BLOOMBERG L. NEWS (Aug. 13, 2018, 4:09 PM), https://news.
bloomberglaw.com/health-law-and-business/hospitals-government-at-odds-over-medicareappeals-drawdown [https://perma.cc/QT78-BG9G].
106. Defendant’s Status Report, supra note 105.
107. Id.
108. LaPointe, supra note 104.
109. Id.
110. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Azar, No. 14-cv-851 (JEB), 2018 WL 5723141, at *3–4 (D.D.C.
Nov. 1, 2018).
111. Id. at *3.
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does not amount to causation, the timing is too coincidentally close to
seriously argue that the court’s decision on mandamus was a nonfactor in
Congress’s appropriations decisions. So, when all is said and done, does
it matter if mandamus was appropriate in this situation? Do the ends
justify the means?
This Note argues that the means matter—or, rather, that they should
matter. The outcome in this case amounts to judges legislating from the
bench, determining legislative priorities through judicial fiat. Due to the
national role of HHS, one activist circuit controlled the outcome for the
entire country. This decision has precarious implications for the
separation of powers.
In the face of ambiguity, judicial deference to executive interpretation
and agency prioritization has long been the standard.112 The strongest
rationale the D.C. Circuit presented in issuing mandamus was an
obligation to “enforce the law as Congress has written it.”113 However,
given the built-in relief valve in the system through the ability to escalate
a claim,114 the deadline in question is not unambiguously mandatory.
Even in situations where Congress has written a clear and unambiguous
mandatory deadline, the courts are split on whether an action under
§ 706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)115 grants the courts
discretion when the agency misses a mandatory deadline or if the courts
are mandated to enforce the deadline without deference to agency
priorities.116 The D.C. Circuit picked and chose from its own
precedent,117 focusing on the extended delay present in this case to justify
intervention. By doing so, the D.C. Circuit exercised pressure on the
legislative branch to act quickly or risk placing the executive branch in
contempt of court. While Congress can attempt to limit an agency’s
discretion in implementing policy directives through clear directives,118
the amount of funding originally appropriated speaks even louder than
the statutory relief valve as to congressional priorities: OMHA’s ability

112. See generally Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive
Interpretation, 126 YALE L.J. 908, 912 (2017) (stating that judicial deference to executive and
administrative interpretation “casts a long shadow” over American administrative law).
113. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
114. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(d)(3) (2012).
115. Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
116. See generally Catherine Zaller, Note, The Case for Strict Statutory Construction of
Mandatory Agency Deadlines Under Section 706(1), 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1545, 1546 (2001)
(discussing varied interpretations of § 706(1) of the APA as it relates to the courts’ discretion).
117. See, e.g., In re United Mine Workers of Am. Int’l Union, 190 F.3d 545, 554 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (arguing that limited resources provide only a temporary excuse for inaction when facing a
statutory deadline).
118. See Zaller, supra note 116, at 1553.
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to meet the statutory deadlines was not a congressional priority until the
D.C. Circuit made it so.
Granted, “[i]nformal pressure” has been recognized as acceptable
under the separation of powers doctrine.119 While the Constitution
assigns functions to the different branches and officials of government,
“separation of powers does not prohibit officials in other branches from
using their governmental power to exert informal influence over the
carrying out of th[at] function.”120 Indeed, this is quite commonplace; the
President may consider the impact on his legislative agenda if he pursues
an unpopular appointment,121 and agencies look to congressional
committee records for indications of how the legislature intended that
funds be spent.122 But this case is distinguished from these typical and
expected political barters: this is a case of formal, not informal, pressure.
The D.C. Circuit ordered the district court to issue mandamus to the
Secretary.123 This order resulted in legislative, rather than administrative,
action. This type of political maneuver is expected in the halls of the
Capitol but is disillusioning and discouraging coming from the federal
bench.
The events of this case make clear that at least Congress believed that
OMHA truly did not have sufficient resources to properly enact its
mandate as interpreted by the court.124 Once the D.C. District Court
issued mandamus, Congress allocated significant additional funding to
OMHA, even though the order was still being appealed.125 Ironically, the
D.C. District Court eventually stated that complying with the order of
mandamus was “possible” only in light of the additional funding granted
by Congress.126 Essentially, this writ of mandamus functioned as a
judicial order dictating the legislative agenda; since this agenda was
followed post hoc, the originating order was self-justified.

119. Jack M. Beermann, An Inductive Understanding of Separation of Powers, 63 ADMIN.
L. REV. 467, 510 (2011) (emphasis omitted).
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., Mark Landler & Maggie Haberman, Brett Kavanaugh Is Trump’s Pick for
Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/09/us/politics/
brett-kavanaugh-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/KW9T-EF68].
122. Beermann, supra note 119, at 511.
123. Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Azar, No. 14-cv-851 (JEB), 2018 WL 5723141, at *3 (D.D.C. Nov.
1, 2018).
124. See id. at *2.
125. Defendant’s Status Report, supra note 105, at 1; HHS Fiscal Year 2018, supra note 105;
Phifer, supra note 105.
126. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 2018 WL 5723141, at *4.
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B. An Undefined Problem
Though reaching different results, both circuits prescribed treatment
without ever diagnosing the cause. The Fourth Circuit evaded the
question of causation by leaving the remedy entirely to the political
process.127 In doing so, the court assumed that a legislative solution was
available to solve what could just as easily have been an issue of agency
drift or mismanagement of resources. The D.C. Circuit took a more
straightforward “enough is enough” stance and ordered action, in
whatever form the Secretary saw fit, to fix the problem.128 The court
assumed that there were solutions within the Secretary’s power to pursue.
Both courts erred in failing to identify the root cause of the problem
before providing an answer.
This is not to say that the courts did not exercise sufficient caution in
their analyses. Both courts acknowledged the underlying equitable nature
of mandamus: even if the courts can properly exercise mandamus
jurisdiction,129 that does not mean they should.130 A preference for one
circuit’s outcome over the other is rooted in a philosophical preference
for a deferential or active judiciary.131 This Note does not argue that either
court failed to exercise sufficient caution or due care in making a
decision. Indeed, each circuit can be seen as deferring to different parts
in the legislative timeline: the Fourth Circuit deferred to the ongoing
legislative process,132 whereas the D.C. Circuit enforced the legislation
127. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Burwell, 816 F.3d 48, 57 (4th Cir. 2016) (“While
the Secretary laments this and Congress recognizes it, both are presently attempting to revive the
process. As bleak as these circumstances appear to be, however, we are unpersuaded that Article
III treatment of the ailing Article II patient in the manner the Hospital System urges is the answer
or, indeed, even possible or desirable.”).
128. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 14-cv-851 (JEB), 2016 WL 7076983, at *3 (D.D.C.
Dec. 5, 2016), vacated, 867 F.3d 160 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
129. This, as the Fourth Circuit notes, is not a certainty, but is assumed in this paragraph
arguendo. See Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 816 F.3d at 54–57.
130. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 53 (D.D.C. 2014) (explaining that
equitable relief does not automatically follow a finding of a statutory violation, but that “respect
for the autonomy and comparative institutional advantage of the executive branch has traditionally
made courts slow to assume command over an agency’s choice of priorities” (quoting In re Barr
Labs., Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 74 (D.C. Cir. 1991))), rev’d, 812 F.3d 183 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
131. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Why We Need More Judicial Activism, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM, EXECUTIVE POWER, AND THE SPIRIT OF MODERATION 11 (Giorgi Areshidze
et al. eds., 2016) (calling for more judicial activism); cf. Norm Ornstein, How Activist Judges
Undermine the Constitution, ATLANTIC (Sept. 18, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2014/09/how-activist-judges-undermine-the-constitution/380413/ [https://perma.cc/ JL6M9WHL] (arguing against judicial activism).
132. See Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 816 F.3d at 56 (“[I]f the backlog were attributable to
Congress’ failure to fund the program more fully or otherwise to provide a legislative solution, it
would likewise be a problem for Congress, not the courts, to address.”).
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as written through the legislative process.133 Both courts went to great
lengths to discuss whether mandamus jurisdiction was appropriate, based
on canons of statutory interpretation and precedent, and both courts
considered whether judicial action would improperly interfere with the
role of the legislature.134 This task is particularly difficult in the
administrative law context,135 and it is clear that both courts understood
the importance of considering all relevant factors.
However, understanding the cause of a problem is central to creating
an adequate solution. Administrative agencies are in a unique position to
develop and demand a comprehensive record that should allow for
rational decision-making to both enforce congressional policy and avoid
drift.136 In reviewing the agency’s failure to act, neither court showed an
appreciation for the need to identify the cause of the problem before
deciding whether the court could or should act with any degree of
authority. The courts’ approach to crafting a remedy in situations of
agency delay should be careful and narrow, speaking to the source of
dysfunction in the facts presented. If the backlog was primarily
attributable to inefficient management of agency resources, or even a
willful refusal to obey the statutory requirements, then the courts’
contempt power may well have proven a powerful tool to fight
institutional inertia. However, if the backlog was caused by factors
outside of the agency’s control, such as inadequate funding, what would
have been the next step? Was the court willing to hold the Secretary in
contempt for the lack of congressional action? Without knowing the
cause of the backlog, a writ of mandamus could be classified as anything
from a risky gamble trying to provide a well-intentioned nudge in the
right direction to an unsubstantiated bluff that encroaches on a role
properly left to the Secretary or the Legislature.

133. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 191 (“‘[H]owever many priorities the agency may
have, and however modest its personnel and budgetary resources may be, there is a limit to how
long it may use these justifications to excuse inaction in the face of’ a statutory deadline.”
(alteration in original) (quoting In re United Mine Workers of Am. Int’l Union, 190 F.3d 545, 554
(D.C. Cir. 1999))).
134. See Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 816 F.3d at 56; Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 192.
135. See generally Now What? Some Thoughts on Judicial Remedies in Administrative Law,
YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/
administrative_law/2017/10/011_now_what.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/KX5L-Q8W8]
(discussing the difficulties inherent in balancing judicial review of administrative decisions with
the need for executive deference).
136. See generally Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments
of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987) (discussing the difficulties inherent in
balancing agency efficiency while adhering to congressional mandate).
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C. A “Possible” Solution
The foregoing discussion leaves more questions than answers. How
can the courts enforce required agency actions without risking
overstepping into legislative policy-setting? Is there ever a “safe”
situation to intervene, without implicating concerns about separation of
powers? Yes, and the D.C. Circuit, on a second appeal, provided a
pathway forward.
The courts may intervene by incorporating an explicit factual finding
of possibility before issuing a writ of mandamus. It is a simple but
important idea: the courts should not order an agency to do the
impossible.137 Therefore, before ordering an agency to act, a court should
make an explicit factual finding that it is possible for the agency to act in
a way that solves the problem. If the court finds that the agency’s inaction
is due to mismanagement of resources or agency drift, mandamus can and
should issue against the administrative agency to correct its failure to
effectuate its duties. If, however, the court finds that the agency’s inaction
is due to inadequate resources—a legislative matter—mandamus should
not issue. This finding of possibility will help the court distinguish
between situations that can guide administrative agencies to fulfill their
mandate compared to those that would, ultimately, dictate legislative
priorities.
Contrary to American Hospital Association v. Price,138 this finding of
fact should be incorporated into the initial jurisdictional or equitable
considerations the court analyzes before issuing mandamus against an
administrative agency in cases of delay or inaction. In American Hospital
Association v. Price, this finding of fact was deemed to be a critical piece
of the puzzle only on a second appeal to the D.C. Circuit.139 By
incorporating the finding as an initial criterion, the courts can get it right
the first time and avoid excessive and unnecessary litigation where the
appellant is forced to plead against being held in contempt for failing to
do the impossible.
Furthermore, a finding of possibility can help the courts avoid
legislating from the bench by inadvertently—or purposefully—ordering
congressional action through judicial fiat. “[L]egislating from the bench”
started as a political slogan but has become something of an unspoken
and accepted reality.140 The courts are simply not designed to make
137. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Price, 867 F.3d 160, 161 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (stating that “[o]ught
implies can” when issuing a writ of mandamus).
138. 867 F.3d 160 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
139. See id. at 161.
140. See Linda Greenhouse, Opinion, Let’s Legislate from the Supreme Court Bench, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/13/opinion/lets-legislate-from-thesupreme-court-bench.html [https://perma.cc/UL9Y-M3KK].
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complex policy decisions that undergird the appropriations process and
should not make the attempt.141 The funding power has long been
recognized as the quintessential legislative power.142 While the funding
power is typically discussed at the intersection of legislative and
executive power,143 this Note argues that the impact of the judiciary
ordering administrative action must be examined as well. The judiciary
can implement a safeguard against infringing on this power by
determining, from the outset, whether it is possible for the agency to
comply with the order sought without receiving additional resources from
Congress.
CONCLUSION
When the judiciary can order the legislature to legislate, the
fundamental structure of the American system of government is at risk.
The courts’ failure to identify the cause of the problem does not absolve
them of the resulting overreach into the realm of making policy decisions.
Though mandamus was issued to an administrative agency, the writ
evidently and eventually required legislative action for the administrative
agency to comply.144 By not making a factual determination as to the
cause of OMHA backlog, the D.C. Circuit purposefully disregarded the
very real chance (which, this Note has argued, was actualized) that the
judiciary would usurp the role of the legislature by, in effect, dictating the
allocation of funding. By incorporating an explicit factual finding of
possibility before issuing a writ of mandamus against an administrative
agency for inaction or delay, the courts can avoid overreach and still
mandate agency action when appropriate.

141. See Richard S. Wells & Joel B. Grossman, The Concept of Judicial Policy-Making: A
Critique, 15 J. PUB. L. 286, 289 (1966).
142. See Zachary S. Price, Funding Restrictions and Separation of Powers, 71 VAND. L.
REV. 357, 357 (2018).
143. See, e.g., id. at 382.
144. See LaPointe, supra note 104.
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